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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the District Court's sua sponte dismissal of a 
post-conviction relief petition. 
B. Statement of Facts 
Vernon Zipprich is a citizen of Germany. He has lived here lawfully 
as a permanent resident of the United States since he was a child. 
In February, 2007, he was charged with Theft by Possessing Stolen 
Property and Forgery Involving a Financial Transaction Card (Case File. 
CR-2007-0004126-C). The Complaint alleged that he committed these 
crimes between October 27, and October 30, 2006. However, in May, 
2008 he pleaded guilty as part of a plea agreement and was convicted of 
Forgery. 
Mr. Zipprich was told that this conviction would not result in his 
removal from the United States. Eventually, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement officials arrested Mr. Zipprich and currently Mr. Zipprich is 
facing deportation. Mr. Zipprich filed a petition for post-conviction relief. 
The District Judge dismissed the petition citing that it was not timely and 
declaring that there was no duty to warn the Petitioner the consequences 
of his plea, or at least adequate notice was given. The District Court 
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refused to recognize that the Petitioner's plea was not voluntary, knowing 
and intelligent because it was based on material misinformation. 
C. Course of the Proceedings. 
On April 8, 2013, the Petitioner filed his Verified Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief. 
A few days later, District Judge Molly Huskey, issued an Order 
Setting an Evidentiary Hearing which set a Conference Status Hearing 
for May 13, 2013 and an Evidentiary Hearing for August 1, 2013. 
On April 29, 2013, the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney filed 
an Answer to the Petition. 
On May 13, 2013 the Court held a Status Hearing. The prosecutor 
advised the District Court that they would be moving for summary 
dismissal. The District Court gave the State a deadline of July 8, 2013, to 
file a motion for summary dismissal. 
However, on May 15, 2013 issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss 
Post-Conviction Petition and an Order taking Judicial Notice. A day later 
the District Court issued an Amended Notice of Intent to Dismiss Uniform 
Post-Conviction Petition. C.R. pp. 48 77. 
Rather than describing deficiencies, the District Court advocated 
against the Petitioner's application. 
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Based on the District Court's May 24, 2013, Notice, the State 
responded with a Notice RE: Filing of Summary Dismissal Motion, 
basically stating that it would wait to see what happened with the judge's 
notice before moving forward with its motion. 
On June 17, 2013, the Petitioner filed a Response to Notice of Intent 
to Dismiss along with the Petitioner's new Affidavit and the Affidavit of 
Harald Zipprich (the Petitioner's father). 
On July 1, 2013, the District Judge issued an Order Dismissing the 
Petitioner's post-conviction petition, a Second Order Taking Judicial 
Notice, and Final Judgment. All pending hearings were vacated. The 
Petitioner was not given any opportunity to respond to the evidence the 
District Court referenced in this Second Order ( an audio tape of the 
Sentencing in the underlying criminal case which was never transcribed. 
On July 24, 2013, the Petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal 
appealing to the Supreme Court. 
II. ISSUES 
A. Due Process Issues: 
1. Did the District Court error procedurally to issue a dismissal sua 
sponte before the State moved and argued for dismissal, thus advocating a 
position rather than being an objective decision maker? 
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2. Did the District Court error in declaring that the trial defense 
attorney or the immigration judge had not affirmatively misrepresented 
the immigration consequences, and in fact ruled such contrary to the 
affidavits of the Petitioner and his father? 
3. Did the District Court error in declaring that the Petitioner's 
false belief was not based on the trial defense attorney's representations 
in absence of any record from the trial defense attorney and did the 
District Court error by denying the Petitioner the opportunity to develop 
and present evidence from the trial defense attorney? 
4. Did the District Court error by not having a full understanding 
of the immigration proceedings, assuming in its Order that the basis for 
the federal immigration action in this case was based on a subsequent 
arrest, ignoring the evidence of the actual basis for the immigration action 
presented in the Petitioner's Response? 
5. Did the District Court error 1n taking judicial notice by 
listening to a recording of the sentencing hearing, and then ruling on facts 
it gleaned from this action without a transcript or an opportunity for 
further response from the Petitioner? 
6. Did the District Court violate due process protections by 
advocating against the petitioner, on a self-researched partial record, 
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without allowing the benefit of a full record, or response to the "judicially 
noticed" facts and arguments presented in the Court's final order? 
B. Timeliness: 
Did the District Judge error by ruling that the affirmative 
misinformation provided by his counsel was not a sufficient due process 
violation which should toll the time for filing? 
C. Voluntary, Knowing and Intelligent Plea: 
Did the District Judge error by ruling that despite the affirmative, 
material misinformation provided by his trial counsel, the Petitioner still 
entered his plea voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently? 
III. STANDARD AND SCOPE OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a district court's order of summary dismissal in a 
post-conviction relief proceeding, the Court applies the same standard as 
that applied by the district court. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444, 180 
P.3d at 483. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 674-75, 227 P.3d 925, 928-29 
(2010). On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application 
without an evidentiary hearing, the appellate court determines whether a 
genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions together with any affidavits on file. Wolf v. State, 266 P.3d 
1169, 152 Idaho 64 (2011). 
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On appeal from the summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief, the inquiry is whether the application, affidavits, or 
other evidence supporting the application allege facts which, if true, 
would entitle the applicant to relief. Hayes v. State, 195 P.3d 712, 146 
Idaho 353 (2008); Sheahan v. State, 190 P.3d 920, 146 Idaho 101 (2008) 
In reviewing a summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the 
appellate court liberally construes the facts and reasonable inferences in 
favor of the applicant. Nevarez v. State, 187 P.3d 1253, 145 Idaho 878 
(2008). 
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and 
whether the prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
this Court exercises free review. Doe v. City of Elk River, 144 Idaho 337, 
338, 160 P.3d 1272, 1273 (2007). Summary judgment is proper only when 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 271, 923 P.2d at 978 (citing I.R.C.P. 
56(c); Mutual of Enumclaw v. Box, 127 Idaho 851, 852, 908 P.2d 153, 154 
(1995)). 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure Act, LC. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-
conviction relief is a civil proceeding, governed by the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 
(2008). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes "summary dismissal of an 
application for post-conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party 
or upon the trial court's own initiative. Summary dismissal of an 
application is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under 
I.R.C.P. 56." State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180 P.3d 476, 483 
(2008). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906(b) governs those situations where the trial 
court on its own initiative determines to dismiss a post-conviction 
petition, reads as follows: 
"(b) When a court is satisfied, on the basis of the 
application, the answer or motion, and the record, that the 
applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief and no 
purpose would be served by any further proceedings, it may 
indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application 
and its reasons for so doing. The applicant shall be given an 
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opportunity to reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal. 
In light of the reply, or on default thereof, the court may order 
the application dismissed or grant leave to file an amended 
application or, direct that the proceedings otherwise continue. 
Disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if there 
exists a material issue of fact. 
The question on appeal from summary dismissal of application for 
post-conviction relief is whether application, affidavits, or other evidence 
supporting application alleged facts which, if true, would entitle 
applicant to relief. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 873 P.2d 898 (1994). 
B. Due Process. 
1. The District Court's Advocacy. In considering an application for 
post-conviction relief, the court must look to substance and disregard 
defects of form. Clark v. State, 92 Idaho 827, 452 P.2d 54 (1969). The 
allegations in an application for post-conviction relief must be deemed to 
be true until those allegations are controverted by state. Hall v. State, 126 
Idaho 449,885 P.2d 116 (1994). 
In this case, the District Court was put on notice that the State 
intended to file a Motion for Summary Dismissal. Clerk's Record ("C.R.") 
at p. 2. However, and somewhat inexplicably, the District Court took it 
upon itself to research the record prior to the State's Motion, and upon 
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finding a written Rule 11(d)(1) advisory, sought to dismiss the Petitioner's 
application. See Order Taking Judicial Notice. C.R. p. 57 et seq. 
The notice of intent to dismiss an application for post-conviction 
relief must state the reasons for dismissal in order to provide an applicant 
with a meaningful opportunity to provide further legal authority or 
evidence that may demonstrate the existence of a genuine factual issue. 
Garza v. State, 82 P.3d 445, 139 Idaho 533 (2003). 
Instead, the District Court took this opportunity to argue against the 
Petitioner's application before a full record had even been developed. 
This put the Petitioner in the awkward position of arguing against the 
judge rather than the State. An impartial decisionmaker is an essential 
element of due process. Morris v. City of Danville, Va., 744 F.2d 1041, 
1044 (4th Cir. 1984)(citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271, 90 S.Ct. 
1011, 1022, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970)). 
2. The District Court's Disregard of the Affidavits of the Petitioner and 
His Father. Summary dismissal of an application for post-conviction 
relief is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no 
genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, 
would entitle the applicant to the requested relief; if such a factual issue 
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is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Buss v. State, 
211 P.3d 123, 147 Idaho 514 (2009). 
On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application 
without an evidentiary hearing, appellate court determines whether a 
genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and 
admissions together with any affidavits on file; moreover, the court 
liberally construes the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party. Yakovac, at 444. 
In instant case, the District Court disregarded the statements in the 
Petitioner's affidavit and that of his father. When considering summary 
dismissal of an application for post-conviction relief, the trial court must 
accept verified allegations of fact in application or in supporting affidavits 
as true, no matter how incredible they may appear, unless they are 
disproved by other evidence in the record. Dunlap v. State, 126 Idaho 
901, 894 P.2d 134, (1995). While the District Court points to other 
evidence, the statements made by the Defendant and counsel do not 
disprove his errant understanding of the immigration consequences of his 
plea of guilty. Indeed, the Defendant was confidently conceding that 
immigration consequences might attach, because he had clearly been 
assured that they would not. 
APPELLANT BRIEF Page 12 of 27 
If an application for post-conviction relief contains facts that, if 
resolved in applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to his requested 
relief, the court must conduct an evidentiary hearing. Hassett v. State, 
127 Idaho 313, 900 P.2d 221(1995). Thus, if the trial defense attorney 
testified that he, the Defendant, and his father were all proceeding under 
material misinformation, the Applicant would be entitled to relief. 
3. Absence of Testimony from the Trial Defense Attorney. In the 
Dunlop decision, a defendant claimed that his attorney stated that the 
prosecutor had agreed to a plea bargain under which he would receive no 
more than three years' incarceration if he pleaded guilty. Upon 
consideration of these facts, the Court declared that whether 1) counsel 
represented to defendant that such agreement existed, 2) no agreement 
was in fact made, or 3) the agreement, if it existed, was breached, were all 
relevant questions of fact which could have lead the Court to conclude 
that defendant's counsel had made misrepresentations to defendant. 
Dunlap v. State, 126 Idaho 901, 894 P.2d 134, (1995). 
Even though the District Court is not ordinarily required to order 
discovery on an application for post-conviction relief, it must do so if it is 
necessary to protect applicant's substantive rights. Griffith v. State, 121 
Idaho 371, 825 P.2d 94 (1992). See also Criminal Rule 57(b). 
APPELLANT BRIEF Page 13 of 27 
In this case, the Petitioner certainly had the right to seek the 
testimony of his trial defense counsel. As explained to the District Court 
in the Petitioner's Response, the defense trial counsel was retired, and all 
attempts to locate him up to the date of the Response had proven 
unsuccessful. The representations of trial defense counsel were crucial to 
proving the Petitioner's assertions. And if the trial defense counsel would 
not make himself available voluntarily, then the compulsory process of 
discovery would have been unquestionably necessary. 
In this case, the District Court, however apparently believed that his 
testimony was of no value. The District Court concluded that the record 
of the sentencing hearing reflected trial counsel's advice. However this 
completely discounts the possibility that the Petitioner was told not to 
worry about the notices the trial court gave concerning his risk of 
deportation. Such goes to the very heart of Petitioner's application. 
The District Court should not have made its rulings without hearing 
from the trial counsel first, or at least allowing the Petitioner sufficient 
opportunity to seek the testimony of trial counsel through discovery. 
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4. The District Court's Speculation and Errant Understanding of the 
Immigration Proceedings. Although the District Court makes somewhat 
passing comments concerning the Petitioner's immigration proceedings 
which came subsequent to the taking of the plea and entry of conviction, 
it has a unmistakable impact on her final decision. 
After listening to the audio tape of the Petitioner's father's testimony 
at the sentencing hearing, she suggests that his understanding is that he 
would not be in further trouble unless the Defendant got arrested again. 
The District Court then assumes that this is what happened, in absence of 
a record supporting her speculation. 
Although the Petitioner was not immediately picked up by 
immigration officials, the delay was purely coincidental to a probation 
violation related to the Petitioner accepting a job at a convenience store in 
Boise, which lies outside of but contingent to the relevant judicial district. 
Instead of speculating as to the delayed action, the District Judge must 
rely upon the evidence, namely the Exhibit attached to the Petitioner's 
Response which shows the basis for their action was the conviction 
alone. 
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5. The District Court's Taking of Judicial Notice Without a 
Transcript or an Opportunity for the Petitioner to Respond. The statutory 
duty to specify the reasons for the proposed dismissal of an application 
for post-conviction relief rests solely with the district court and it is the 
district court alone who is responsible for drafting the notice of intent to 
dismiss. Crabtree v. State, 163 P.3d 1201, 144 Idaho 489 (2006). 
A district court's notice of intent to dismiss an application for post-
conviction relief should provide sufficiently particular information 
regarding the basis for its ruling so as to enable the applicant to 
supplement the application with the necessary additional facts, if they 
exist. Crabtree v. State, 163 P.3d 1201, 144 Idaho 489 (2006). 
When a district court determines sua sponte that claims alleged in 
an application for post-conviction relief do not entitle an applicant to 
relief, the district court must provide notice of its intent to dismiss and 
allow the applicant 20 days to respond with additional facts to support 
his or her claims. Crabtree v. State, 163 P.3d 1201, 144 Idaho 489 (2006). 
The purpose of the statutory requirement that an applicant for post-
conviction relief be given 20 days to reply to a proposed dismissal order is 
to ensure that the applicant will have an adequate opportunity to 
challenge an adverse decision before it becomes final. Sabin v. State, 923 
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P.2d 502, 129 Idaho 257 (1996). The requirement also serves the purpose 
of allowing the petitioned court the opportunity to correct any error 
brought to its attention by applicant's reply to the notice. Id. 
It was inappropriate for the district court in this case to provide its 
required notice of intent to dismiss post-conviction application on one 
basis and then to order dismissal on separate basis without an additional 
opportunity to respond. Follinus v. State, 127 Idaho 897, 908 P.2d 590 
(1995). 
Most glaring in this case as to due process is the District Judge's 
"Second Order Taking Judicial Notice" which was entered simultaneously 
with the District Court's Order Dismissing Petition and the Final 
Judgment. This occurred after the Petitioner had submitted his response 
to the District Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss. No new 20-day period 
was provided and no response was allowed despite the fact that the 
District Court relied upon listening to the sentencing hearing in camera, 
after the Petitioner's response was received. No transcript of this hearing 
was provided. 
Courts reviewing applications for post-conviction relief should have 
pertinent portions of trial record ready for review. Saykhamchone v. State, 
127 Idaho 319, 900 P.2d 795 (1995). If the petitioner fails to submit an 
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adequate record, the State must do so. Id. In determining that the 
Petitioner was not entitled to post-conviction relief, the District Court 
should not have taken judicial notice of trial proceedings based on her 
own recollection of what she heard from an audio tape of the sentencing 
proceedings. This decision was not based on a trial "record." See 
Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 839, P.2d 1215 (1992) (Judge could not 
rely on his own recollection rather than trial record). 
Thus, the District Court failed to provide notice and failed to allow 
a response. 
C. Timeliness. 
A post-conviction applicant may be entitled to file after expiration 
of the limitation period if the applicant is entitled to equitable tolling. 
Schwartz v. State, 177 P.3d 400, 145 Idaho 186 (2008). 
Post-conviction relief claims not known or which could not have 
reasonably been known within 42 days of judgment must be asserted 
within a reasonable time after they are known or reasonably could have 
been known. LC. § 19-2719. Rhoades v. State, 17 P.3d 243, 135 Idaho 299 
(2000). 
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While it is prudent for applicants seeking post-conviction relief to 
allege facts which he contends would avoid the time bar when an 
application is filed outside one-year limitations period established by 
statute, absence of such allegations in the initial pleading is not fatal to 
claims. Anderson v. State, 992 P.2d 783, 133 Idaho 788 (1999). 
The one-year statute of limitations for filing application for post-
conviction relief may be tolled under certain circumstances. Isaak v. 
State, 972 P.2d 1097, 132 Idaho 369 (1999). 
If discovery exception should apply to filing of application for post-
conviction relief, exception must relate to facts learned by applicant after 
expiration of time limit established by statute. Reyes v. State, 913 P.2d 
1183, 128 Idaho 413 (1996). 
In a somewhat similar situation, an application for post-conviction 
relief claiming that petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel 
with respect to revocation of his probation was timely, even though the 
application was filed more than five years after petitioner's conviction. 
The Court found that the application was filed within the time limitation 
if calculated from the probation revocation proceeding; Lake v. State, 124 
Idaho 259, 858 P.2d 798 (1993). See also LC. §§ 18-2505, 19-4902, 19-
4907; U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6; Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 52(a). The Court 
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concluded that rather than denying a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on the grounds of untimeliness, the district court should have 
decided the question on merits. Id. 
A Post-conviction relief petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel on appeal can be asserted within a reasonable time after they 
were known or reasonably could have been known, if they were not 
known or could not reasonably have been known within 42 days of 
judgment. Paz v. State, 123 Idaho 758, 852 P.2d 1355 (1993). Citing LC. § 
19-2719; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6. The Petitioner in this case did not 
become aware of the errant information, until after immigration officials 
took their delayed action. In fact, the lack of action by immigration 
officials actually reinforced the Petitioner's errant belief. 
The issue here is whether the affirmative misrepresentation of 
counsel, and apparently others, led to an errant understanding of the 
consequences of the Petitioner's plea. This in a sense is not simply a 
question of ineffective assistance of counsel, but one of knowing and 
intelligent, and thus, a voluntary plea. 
This errant understanding is in the record. However it is found in 
the audio tape which the District Court listened to but did not have 
transcribed and did not allow the Petitioner an opportunity to respond. 
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As the Petitioner's father clearly states during his testimony, it was 
the understanding of the parties that his conviction would not lead to his 
deportation because the conduct had occurred before the granting of 
relief from deportation. This was simply wrong. Immigration officials 
filed against the Petitioner because the conviction fell after the initial 
relief had been granted. Petitioner listened to the warnings concerning his 
conviction with the clearly errant belief that he already understood what 
the immigration consequences would be. He did not. This is a fact simply 
ignored by the District Judge, despite the Petitioner's affidavit to the 
contrary. 
Thus, the only equitable thing for the Court to do is to allow tolling 
of the limitation until the Petitioner became aware of the errant belief, 
which only became apparent upon his arrest and placement in 
deportation proceedings. The Petition was filed well within a year of this 
event. 
The District Court speculated why this deportation proceeding was 
re-initiated, but clearly ignored the evidence that the deportation was 
initiated solely based on the conviction, as evidenced by Exhibit B in the 
Petitioner's Response to the Court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss, not by 
any other subsequent event. 
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D. Affirmative Misinformation and the Duty of Counsel 
Of clearest error, is the District Court's misinterpretation of Chaidez 
v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1103 (2013). The District Court declared that 
this case stood for the proposition that before the Padilla decision there 
was "simply no Sixth Amendment requirement that defense counsel 
advise the Petitioner of the potential immigration consequences," and 
thus "no deficient performance on the part of trial counsel." Order 
Dismissing Petition p. 6. 
Chaidez however specifically and directly addressed the issue of 
affirmative misinformation: 
True enough, three federal circuits (and a handful of state 
courts) held before Padilla that misstatements about 
deportation could support an ineffective assistance claim. But 
those decisions reasoned only that a lawyer may not 
affirmatively misrepresent his expertise or otherwise actively 
mislead his client on any important matter, however related to 
a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Kwan, 407 
F.3d 1005, 1015-1017 (9th Cir. 2005). They co-existed happily 
with precedent, from the same jurisdictions (and almost all 
others), holding that deportation is not "so unique as to 
warrant an exception to the general rule that a defendant need 
not be advised of the [collateral] consequences of a guilty 
plea." United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 769 (11 th Cir. 
1985). So at most, Chaidez has shown that a minority of 
courts recognized a separate rule for material 
misrepresentations, regardless whether they concerned 
deportation or another collateral matter. 
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Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1112, 185 L. Ed. 2d 149 (2013). 
Although the Court stated this was the rule in "a minority of courts," 
Idaho falls within the jurisdiction of one of those courts (the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals). These cases have not been disturbed. While the 
Chaidez court went on to explain that material misrepresentations were 
not present in that case, the Petitioner in instant case is basing his entire 
claim on material misrepresentation. 
This claim was described extensively in the Defendant's response 
which is reprinted here for the Court's convenience: 
"The Court cites to Chaidez, for the proposition that "requiring 
defense counsel to advise defendant about the risk of deportation as a 
result of a guilty plea did not apply retroactively to cases already on final 
on direct appeal." And the Court later concludes that there was "no 
requirement that he be advised, and that he was in fact advised." 
However, Padilla's holding was that the Defendant's counsel had an 
affirmative duty to provide accurate advice concerning the immigration 
consequences of entering a guilty plea. Padilla at 1482. That is the so 
called "new rule." While the Court is correct, that the Chaidez v. United 
States, 133 S.Ct. 1103 (2013) decision means that "the Padilla standard" 
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does not apply to this case, that does not mean that no standard applies, 
nor does it mean that simple notice is sufficient. 
"This case is one of misinformation. The Petitioner in this case 
acted under the false belief that this conviction would not be held against 
him. This was based on his understanding of the relief he received in 
Immigration Court prior to his plea would apply to the alleged conduct 
charged in this case. However, unquestionably, in direct contradiction to 
this belief, the conviction alone (no subsequent probation violation or 
other offense is cited by the Department of Homeland Security, see 
Exhibit B), is the basis for deportation. Nothing he did subsequent to the 
conviction is at issue. 
"Thus, although Mr. Zipprich was told that there could be potential 
consequences, he falsely believed that would only be in the case of 
further issues, no the conviction which was at issue on that particular 
date. This is not only the Petitioner's understanding, but that of his 
father. And just as importantly, this false belief was stated openly in 
court in the father's testimony, and thus was the understanding of the 
sentencing judge, prosecutor and defense attorney. This will be born out 
in the transcript of the hearing when it is completed. 
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"The Court concludes that the time limit should not be tolled 
because the Petitioner was given notice that there may be consequences 
(the Rule 11(d)(1) notice). Misinformation and misbelief unquestionably 
brings the voluntariness, and knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights 
into question. 
"This however ignores that immigration in fact delayed taking 
action for years without any apparent excuse. This reinforced the 
Defendant's misunderstanding that he in fact was not facing immigration 
consequences for his conviction. That is the equitable reason for tolling. 
"He misunderstood that the conviction was not forgiven in some 
way, and his belief was reasonably held for the subsequent years because 
immigration officials did nothing which disabused him of this 
misunderstanding until his arrest in 2013." Petitioner's Response pp. 4-8. 
This reflected not only on the Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel, but of his rights to all other trial 
protections. In choosing to waive all further rights, and enter a plea the 
Petitioner must have been protected from all material misinformation that 
induced his to otherwise make an unintelligent waiver. Such a waiver 
would be inherently involuntary. 
APPELLANT BRIEF Page 25 of 27 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The primary errors in this case involve: 
1). The sua sponte intervention of the District Court prior to the 
State's Motion to Dismiss; 
2) The errant interpretation of the duty owed to the Petitioner as it 
applied to material misinformation; 
3) The District Court's consideration of new evidence after the 
Petitioner's Response, without allowing a new opportunity to respond; 
4) The District Court's refusal to allow the full development of the 
Petitioner's case based on unavailability of trial defense counsel, which 
required an opportunity at discovery; 
5) The District Court's ignoring of facts set forth in the Petitioner's 
affidavit and that of the Petitioner's father; 
6) The District Court's speculation as to the proceeding in 
immigration court, rather than development of a factual basis for her 
conclusions that the conviction had not caused the Petitioner's 
deportation proceedings; and 
7) Based on these misinterpretations, speculation and discounting 
of the facts, the District Court did not recognize that equitable tolling of 
the statute of limitations was unquestionably appropriate in this case. 
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WHEREFORE, it is appropriate for this Court to Vacate and Reverse 
the Final Judgment and Order Dismissing Petition, and to remand this 
case to the District Court for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 13th Day of November, 2013. 
Teal, ISB W-6565 
the Appellant 
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